With oblivious transfer multiparty protocols become possible even in the presence of a faulty majority. But all known protocols can be aborted by just one disruptor. This paper presents more robust solutions for multiparty protocols with oblivious transfer. This additional robustness against disruptors weakens the security of the protocol and the guarantee that the result is correct. We can observe a trade off between robustness against disruption and security and correctness.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a multiparty protocol a set P of players wants to correctly compute a function f (a 1 , . . . , a n ) which depends on secret inputs of n players. Some players might collude to cheat in the protocol as to obtain information about secret inputs of the other players or to modify the result of the computation.
Using oblivious transfer multiparty protocols for arbitrary functions can be carried out with unconditional security if all players are willing to cooperate [1, 8, 5] . But already one disruptor can abort the protocol without being identified.
This contribution generalizes the unconditionally secure multiparty protocols with oblivious transfer to the case where we don't only care about security and correctness but also about robustness against disruptors.
The basic idea is to define protocols where either no possible collusion of disruptors can abort the protocol or a cheater is identified unambiguously. Then the protocol can be restarted without the cheater.
To be able to enhance the robustness of protocols we have to make some assumptions about possible collusions. We model possible collusions by defining a set of collusions. Only one of these possible collusions is actually cheating. Within this set of colluding players the players share their input and take actions based on their common knowledge.
Definition 1 An adversary structure is a monotone set A ⊆ 2 P , i. e., for subsets S ′ ⊆ S of P the property S ∈ A implies S ′ ∈ A. By assumption one set of A contains all cheaters.
The main properties of a multiparty protocol are:
1. A multiparty protocol is said to be A-secure if no single collusion from A is able to obtain information about the secret inputs of other participants which cannot be derived from the result and the inputs of the colluding players.
2. A multiparty protocol is A-partially correct if no possible collusion can let the protocol terminate with a wrong result.
3. A multiparty protocol is A-correct whenever no single collusion from A can abort the protocol, modify its result, or deviate from the protocol in a way that an honest player obtains information about the secret inputs of another player which cannot be derived from the result and the input of this honest player.
A multiparty protocol is called A-fair if no collusion from
A can reconstruct the result of the multi party computation earlier then all honest participants together. No collusion should be able to run off with the result.
A multiparty protocol having the properties 1., 2. and 4. is called A-partially robust and a protocol having all four above properties is called A-robust.
By assumption one set of A contains all players who deviate from the protocol. Hence we demand security against only one possible collusion which has to contain all cheaters as well as all disruptors.
Sometimes a set M is able to reconstruct a secret due to the cheating of players who are not contained in M . In this situation we will always look at the complete set of cheaters necessary to obtain this situation. So even in an A-secure protocol with M ∈ A it can happen that the players of M can reconstruct a secret if some players outside of M are cheating, too.
All players are considered to be curious, i. e., even the honest players will try to learn as much as possible from the information accessible while following the protocol.
II. PREVIOUS WORK A. Multiparty Computations with Private Channels
We will summarize next what can be achieved by classical multiparty computations when private channels are available between any two players as well as a broadcast channel. The next result is taken from [9] for a history see references therein.
Theorem 2 Given a set P of players with an authenticated secure channel between each pair of players together with a broadcast cannel, then every function can be computed by an A-partially robust multiparty protocol if no two sets from A cover the complete set P of players.
But if we additionally conslider disruption the result does not hold any more:
Remark 3 There exist functions for which a multiparty protocol among players who have access to a broadcast channel and have authenticated secure channels connecting every pair of players cannot be A-robust if two collusions cover P \ {P i } for some player P i .
Proof: Whenever two players mutually accuse each other to not use the secure channels approriately it is not possible for the remaining honest players to decide which of the two players is cheating and the secure channel between the two players cannot be used.
If the players of two possible collusions A 1 , A 2 ∈ A covering P \ {P i } cannot use the secure channels between them for the above reason, then again it is not clear for P i which of the two possible collusion is cheating. To continue with the protocol all messages between players who are complaining about each other have to be exchanged over the broadcast channel or over secure channels via P i . Obviously P i learns all secrets or the protocol must be aborted. In both cases the protocol is not A-robust. 2
B. Multiparty Computations with Oblivious Transfer
This subsection summarizes the previous work on multiparty protocols with oblivious transfer.
In the following we will always think of the oblivious transfer channel as being a stronger primitive than authenticated private channels. All oblivious tranfer channels in the remainder of this paper are authenticated and secure and we will not state these properties any more.
Given an oblivious transfer channel all secure two party computations become possible with perfect security [11] . This result was generalized to allow multiparty computations with a dishonest majority [1, 8, 5] . One obvious problem with such protocols is that if a majority of players cannot run off with the secret, i. e., they cannot reconstruct the secret on their own, then a minority of players can abort the protocol. This is problematic if it is not clear who is cheating otherwise the protocol could be restarted without the cheaters. To capture what can be achieved in this case we made the distinction between partial correctness and correctness.
The result of [1, 8, 5] can then be stated as 
III. MORE ROBUST MULTIPARTY PROTOCOLS: AN OVERVIEW
In this section we shortly overview the protocol presented in this paper to simplify reading. We shortly explain the basic primitives of [5] and sketch our changes to the protocol to obtain more robustness. All these changes will be carried out in detail in the following sections.
As long as no conflict occurs we will follow the protocol of [5] , but whenever disruption takes place we will deviate from the protocol in a way that either resolves the problem or a cheater is identified. Then the protocol can be restarted without the cheater. The exclusion of a player has an impact on the value of the function to be computed. The best way to deal with this would be to have a default input like "unvalid" in a voting scheme. But the effect of the exclusion of such a player is not severe as the player was a cheater anyway and could as well have chosen a random input. We will not discuss this further as the discussion depends strongly on the function to be implemented. There is one more problem with restarting a protocol. If the inputs were time critical someone might force a restart just to be able to change his inputs, this will be avoided in Remark 36.
To be able to restart the protocol without players who did try do disrupt the protocol we have to be able to identify cheaters. To do this we will replace the subprotocols used in [5] by primitives which either terminate successfully or a cheater is identified.
Following [5] we will first give a bit commitment protocol which binds a player to all other players and allows for zero knowledge protocols of linear relations on committed bits. In Section VI we will introduce a protocol which either successfully creates such a bit commitment or a cheater is identified.
Based on this bit commitment one can generate distributed bit commitments where a bit is shared among all players and each player is committed to his "share". Section VII gives a protocol which either successfully creates such a distributed bit commitment or a cheater is identified.
In [5] a committed oblivious transfer protocol was introduced which allows to implement the boolean function AND on distributed bit commitments. Section VIII gives a variant of this protocol which allows to identify a cheater in the case that the protocol fails. The same techniques allow to implement a NOT function on a distributed bit commitment.
with these boolean function we can realize every boolean function on distributed bit commitments by circuit evaluation.
The outline of the complete protocol, given in Section IX, then is:
Initialization Phase: All players have to agree on the function to be computed as well as on the circuit F to be used, they have to agree on an adversary structure A such that the protocol will be A robust and all players have to agree on the security parameters. Furthermore the players agree on how to, in case of a restart of the protocol, choose the input of a cheater which has been excluded from the protocol.
Then all players create distributed bit commitments to commit to their inputs. All players will be able to generate distributed bit commitments or a cheater is identified and the protocol can be restarted without the cheater.
Computing Phase: The circuit F is evaluated using AND and NOT gates on the distributed bit commitments. Each of these boolean gates is either applied successfully or a cheater is identified and the protocol can be restarted without him.
Revelation Phase: The result of a computation is hidden in the "shares" of distributed bit commitments. These have to be unveiled in a way to ensure the fairness of the protocol. Following [5] this can be done by techniques known in the literature [3, 8] .
In Section XI we analyze the situation after the protocol has terminated. After the termination we can make more precise statements about the security.
IV. MORE ROBUST MULTIPARTY PROTOCOLS: WHAT IS IMPOSSIBLE
The aim of this contribution is to enhance the robustness of multiparty protocols with oblivious transfer. No possible collusion should be able to abort the protocol. This results in a tradeoff between security, parial correctness, and robustness which will be analyzed in the following.
We first give a bound on the robustness which can be achieved. The bound is tight as our protocols reach this bound.
Lemma 5 Let P be a set of players for which each pair of players is connected by an oblivious transfer channel and each player has access to a broadcast channel. Then A-robust multiparty computations are impossible for all functions if two sets of A cover P \ {P i } for a player P i ∈ P or |P | = 2.
Proof: Whenever two players mutually accuse each other to not properly use the oblivious transfer channel it is impossible for the remaining honest players to decide which of the two players is actually refusing to cooperate. Let A and B be two possible collusions covering P \ {P i }, such that all the players from A are in conflict with all the players from B about refusing to use the oblivious transfer channel. Then the oblivious transfer channels between the players of A and the players of B cannot be used and it is impossible for P i to decide who is cheating.
The player P i must assist the players from A and B. As no other player can assist we are in the three party situation with an oblivious transfer channel only between a player Alice and P i and a player Bob and P i . For each bit being transferred from Alice to Bob the player P i knows either as much as Alice about this bit or he knows as much as Bob. The players Alice and Bob cannot agree on a bit known to both without P i knowing it, too. Many functions can hence not be computed by multiparty protocols in this situation. 2
V. THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICTS
In this paper we will often take actions depending on an analysis of the complaints some players have broadcasted about other players. For this we introduce the notion of a conflict and look at the computational complexity of such an analysis.
Definition 6
We say that two players P i , P j ∈ P are in conflict with each other if all honest players can derive that one of the two players is cheating.
Whenever all honest players can conclude that either all players from a set A ⊆ P or all players from a set B ⊆ P are cheating we say that these two sets are in conflict with each other. E. g. if a player accuses some other player of cheating these two players are in conflict as either the first player is lying or the second is cheating. Every honest player must complain about every player he knows is cheating. A player who does not report every cheating he detects is thought to be colluding with the dishonest players.
It is clear from the definition that two sets A, B are in conflict if and only if every player from A is in conflict with every player from B.
With the set P of players and the conflicts which occured we can define a graph of conflicts. Together with the adversary structure A we will call it the conflict structure.
Definition 7 A graph Γ with the set P being the vertices and two vertices being connected by an edge iff the two players are in conflict is called the graph of conflicts.
A pair (Γ, A) with Γ = (P, E) being a graph of conflicts and A ⊆ 2 P being an adversary structure is called a conflict structure.
To be able to identify possible collusions which could or cannot be responsible for a given graph of conflicts we define the vertex cover.
Definition 8
For a graph Γ = (P, E) a vertex cover is defined as a subset of the vertices which contains for every edge at least one vertex incident with this edge.
To get results about the complexity of some problems concerning conflict structures we recall the t-vertex cover problem. The t-vertex cover problem is the problem to decide for a given graph if it contains a vertex cover of size t or less. In the following it is of interest that this decision problem is known to be N P-complete [7] .
Remark 9 Let (Γ, A) be a conflict structure and let C denote the set of vertex covers of Γ = (P, E). Then the set of all cheaters is contained in C ∩A. If no vertex cover of Γ is contained in A then the assumption that the set of all cheaters is contained in A is violated.
Proof: By assumption one set of A contains all cheaters, so we have to show that a set from A which is not a vertex cover cannot contain all cheaters. This is trivial as for every set M from A which is not a vertex cover of Γ there exists a pair of players who are in conflict but neither of them is contained in M . By the definition of conflicts one of the two is cheating, but not contained in M and thus M cannot contain all cheaters.
If no vertex cover of Γ is contained in A, then for every set M of A there exists a pair of players who are in conflict but neither of them is contained in M . Hence no set of A contains all cheaters and the assumption is violated.
2 One can view C ∩A as the updated adversary structure after taking into account the conflicts present.
The above remark yields a simple, but not efficient, algorithm, to identify a cheater whenever a cheater can be identified based on the conflict structure present.
Lemma 10 Let (Γ, A) be a conflict structure, let C denote the set of vertex covers of Γ = (P, E), and let M be the set of all cheaters which can be identified by deduction from the conflict structure. Then
Proof: For every vertex cover C ∈ C∩A it is consistent with the conflict structure to assume that only the players in C are cheating. Hence if there exists a vertex cover C ∈ C ∩ A which does not contain a specific player, then this player need not be a cheater. So whenever a cheater can be identified by deduction from the conflict structure he must be contained in S∈C∩A S. On the other hand if this intersection is not empty then every player in this intersection must be cheating as one set of C ∩ A contains only cheaters, which follows from Remark 9.
2 So either M = S∈C∩A S is empty or a cheater can be identified.
Next we will have a short look at the complexity of decision problems related to conflict structures. If e. g. one player has doubts about the validity of the assumption it is, in the worst case, difficult to test if a conflict structure is consistent with the assumption that only one set of A contains cheaters.
Lemma 11 For a given conflict structure (Γ, A) deciding if the assumption that only one set of A contains cheaters is consistent with the graph of conflicts Γ is N Pcomplete.
Proof: If we set A to be the set of all subsets of P with at most t players, then deciding consistency with a given conflict graph Γ is the same as deciding if there exists a vertex cover with at most t vertices. This is N P-complete [7] . 2 In the worst case it is also difficult to identify a cheater by deduction from the conflict structure.
Lemma 12
Identifying a cheater by deduction from a given conflict structure (Γ, A) is N P-hard.
Proof: We show that a search algorithm which can identify a cheater whenever a cheater can be identified by deduction from the conflict structure can be used to decide if a graph has a unique vertex cover of cardinality t.
We let A be the set of all subsets of P with at most t elements. Let identify(Γ) be a search algorithm which identifies a cheater if it is possible to identify a cheater. We will use this algorithm to decide if there is a unique solution to the vertex cover problem. As this uniqueness problem is N P-hard we then have shown the problem of identifying cheaters to be N P-hard (see [10] for the uniqueness problem and [7] for the uniqueness preserving reduction of vertex cover to the satisfiability problem).
To find a unique vertex cover (and hence decide its existence) we run identify(Γ) if no cheater is identified then there is not a unique solution. If a cheater p ∈ P is identified we restrict our graph Γ to P \ {p}. We repeate this procedure until identify has either found enough cheaters such that they form a vertex cover, which then must be a unique vertex cover, or not enough cheaters can be identified and no unique vertex cover exists. 2
A protocol for which it is necessary to identify cheaters whenever possible can be impractical for large numbers of players. Fortunately the protocols of this paper need to identify cheaters only in situations where one player is in conflict with a set of players which is not contained in A. This player is hence easily identified as a cheater. But we still have to be careful because with an inappropriate presentation of the adversary structure A it can even be difficult to decide membership in A.
Remark 13 Let the adversary structure A be given by sets
is a satisfying assignment. Then deciding membership in A is N P-complete.
Proof: Deciding membership in A for a set A is clearly in N P as one can guess a superset of A which yields a satisfying assignemnet for f .
On the other hand we can reduce the satisfiability problem to deciding membership in A. As A contains for every set A ∈ A all the subsets of A the boolean function f has a satisfying truth assignment iff for one player P i we have {P i } ∈ A. 2
VI. COMMITTING TO ALL PLAYERS
To ensure correctness of a multiparty protocol all players should be committed to their inputs and to shares of intermediate results they hold. Furthermore they should be able to give zero knowledge proofs about properties of their inputs.
A. Previous Results
To be able to give zero knowledge proofs about properties of commitments we use the following construction which can be found in [5] .
Definition 14 A bit commitment with Xor (BCX) to a bit b is a commitment to bits
The following result about zero knowledge proofs on BCX can as well be found in [5] and in references therein. Proof: We will not state a full proof here as it can be found in [5] . But we will restate the copying procedure as it is an important subprotocol of all of the following protocols.
Suppose Alice is committed to Bob to a bit b and wants two instances of this commitment. Then Alice creates 3m pairs of bit commitments such that each pair Xors to b. Then Bob randomly partitions these 3m pairs in three subsets of m pairs, thus obtaining three BCX and asks Alice to prove the equality of the first new BCX with her BCX for b. This destroys the old BCX and one of the new BCX, but an honest Alice can thereby convince an honest Bob that the two remaining BCX both stand for the value b.
2 Note that following this protocol of [5] it is possible for a cheater to, with a polynomial probability, create an incorrect BCX where a small (constant) number of pairs b iL , b iR of plainly committed bits have an Xor unequal to the bit committed by the BCX. This does not harm the rest of the multiparty computation as such a small inconsistency either has no influence on the result or it is detected in the course of the protocol and leads to a conflict as a zero knowledge proof or an unveil will be not accepted (the same remark is necessary after Lemma 19).
In a multiparty scenario it is necessary that a player should be committed to all other players. For us it will be enough if a non-collusion (a set of players trustable by definition) is convinced by the zero knowledge proof.
B. Making Commitments More Robust
We will use the GBCX protocol as it is presented in [5] to bind a committing party to a set of players which cannot all collude with the sender. Hence the bit cannot be changed by any allowed collusion.
As the protocol for generating a GBCX needs coin tossing as a subroutine we will briefly show that coin tossing is possible if no two possible collusions cover the complete set of players.
Remark 18 Given a set P of n players having access to a broadcast channel and let every pair of players be connected by an oblivious transfer channel, then A-robust coin tossing is possible if no two collusions of A cover P .
Proof: Every player chooses a random bit and commits to it to every other player. Then the bits are opened using the broadcast channel. Some players might complain about other players. Every bit accepted by a noncollusion is called a valid bit. Then the result of the coin tossing is chosen to be the Xor of the valid bits. Every player whose bit is not accepted must be a cheater as he is in conflict with a non collusion. As only a set of players contained in A can be identified as cheaters and no two sets of A cover P the bits of a non-collusion will be accepted as valid. Therefore the resulting bit is really random as it cannot be chosen by a collusion.
2 It is easy to verify that after generating a GBCX according to [5] the sender of the commitments is bound to all players who did not complain about the sender. Furthermore all players who did not complain are convinced to hold commitments for the same bit. For a given adversary structure A two cases can now occur:
1. A set A ∈ A of players complains about the sender.
Then the sender is bound to all players of the complement A c of A except to himself. The complete collusion necessary now to change the bit would be A c , which has to include the sender or the sender would now complain about all other players and leave the protocol.
2. A set A ∈ A complains about the sender. Then the sender has to leave the protocol.
Whenever the sender is in conflict with a set A of players then this player can only change his commitment by colluding with all other players of A c hence if no two possible collusions of A cover the set P of players then a player is either detected cheating or his commitment is binding. The GBCX remains to be 2 P -secure if used this way.
Summarizing the above we can state the next result without further proof.
Lemma 19 For a set P of players with each pair of players being connected by an oblivious transfer channel and each player having access to a broadcast channel and an adversary structure A for which no two possible collusions cover P it is possible to A-partially robustly and 2 P -securely generate a GBCX or a cheater can be identified.
Note that following this protocol of [5] it is possible for a cheater to, with a polynomial probability, create an incorrect GBCX where a few users have a small (constant) number of pairs a j iL , a j iR of committed bits which have an Xor unequal to the bit committed to by the GBCX. But this does not harm the rest of the multiparty computation as such a small inconsistency either has no influence on the result or it is detected in the course of the protocol and leads to a conflict as a zero knowledge proof or an unveil will be not accepted.
It is an interesting question if one could obtain a higher partial correctness by sacrificing the 2 P -securety, e. g., by exploiting Lemma 24 to obtain oblivious transfer between players in conflict. But we will leave this question open in this paper.
VII. DISTRIBUTED BIT COMMITMENTS
Next we will consider the distributed bit commitment of [5] . Such a distributed bit commitment consists of several bit commitments each to a share of a bit. The multiparty computation will later be computed on those shares. 
If the DBC is constructed in a way that one player knows how to unveil all the GBCX the DBC consists of we say that it is a DBC of this player.
To create, according to [5] , a DBC of a player (Alice) each player creates a GBCX to a random bit and opens it to Alice then Alice creates a GBCX such that the Xor of all GBCX equals the bit b she wants to commit to. The complete multiparty protocol will perform circuit evaluation on the DBC of the players. The intermediate results of this circuit evaluation will again be DBCs but for these no player knows how to unveil all GBCX.
We will give a robust implementation of creating a DBC of a player in our next result. Proof: If Alice wants to generate a DBC for a bit b all players have to commit to a random bit using GBCX and then unveil this bit to Alice. Then Alice will generate a GBCX such that the Xor of all the bits equal the bit b.
The problem is that all the GBCX are only unveiled to Alice. Hence we cannot distinguish between a party refusing to unveil to Alice and Alice just claiming so. All other conflicts can be solved by Lemma 19.
So assume Alice to be in conflict with a set of players A while she is creating a DBC. Then we will force the players from A to unveil their bits publicly. If some players are unable to unveil we have identified cheaters.
We seem to loose a little bit of security or correctness as the complement A c of the set A can reconstruct the secret. But as Alice is contained in A c the secret can only be recovered if Alice is cheating, too. If Alice is part of the collusion the collusion does not learn anything new by reconstructing Alices input bit. 2
VIII. COMMITTED OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER
Next we recall the definition of committed oblivious transfer, the key protocol of [5] . To achieve a robust version of this protocol (Lemma 25) we will need an auxiliary protocol forward oblivious transfer (Lemma 23) and a protocol which successfully implements oblivious transfer even between players who are in conflict or a cheater can be identified (Lemma 24).
A. Forward Oblivious Transfer
In this subsection we will introduce a protocol which allows a sender (Alice) to implement an oblivious transfer to a receiver (Bob) she is in conflict with. We will need the help of a third player (Carol) who will learn all the data sent by Alice, but will be unable to alter the data sent without getting in conflict with either Alice or Bob. We call this protocol forward oblivious transfer as the player Carol "forwards" the data to Bob obliviously. 
Proof:
We prove the claims of the lemma for the following protocol. Carol of (a 0 , a 1 , b) 1. Alice sends the bits a 0 , a 1 to Carol.
Forward Oblivious Transfer via
2. Carol commits to a 0 , a 1 to Alice and to Bob using a GBCX involving only the players Alice, Bob, and Carol. Then Carol opens the commitment to Alice to convince her that she is now committed to a 0 , a 1 to Bob.
3. Bob commits to a bit b to Carol. 0 , a 1 , b) with Bob.
Carol runs COT(a
For the security of the protocol we have to prove that 1. Alice and Carol cannot together learn the secret b of Bob.
2. Bob alone cannot learn the secret a 0 , a 1 of Alice (together with Alice or together with Carol a 0 , a 1 are not secret any more as they can be derived from the input resp. output of the function.) Point 1. is clear from the security of the COT protocol. Point 2. follows directly from the security of the GBCX protocol and the COT protocol. To prove the partial correctness it is enough to prove that Caro alone cannot alter the two bits without getting in conflict with Alice or Bob. Alice can check if the two bits Carol is committed to equal the bits she sent to Carol because of the binding property of the GBCX bit commitment. Bob can check if the bits Carol is committed to equal the bits Alice sent to Carol by the properties of the COT protocol used. 2
B. GCOT from Forward Oblivious Transfer
The player helping in the protocol forward oblivious transfer learns all bits transmitted. To keep up the security we will use the protocol many times with different helpers to obtain oblivious transfer even between players in conflict. Then the secret is distributed among all helping players.
Lemma 24 Given an oblivious transfer channel between any two players as well as a broadcast channel, then for an adversary structure A for which no two sets cover
P \ {P i } for any player P i an A-partially robust, {A ⊆ P |A c ∈
A}-secure multiparty protocol for oblivious transfer can be implemented such that the sender is committed to what he sent and whenever a party complains about the result of the protocol a new conflict arises.
Proof: If the sender and the receiver of an oblivious transfer are not in conflict yet, then a new conflict arises as soon as one party complains. So we are left with the interesting case where the sender and the receiver are already in conflict. In this situation we use the following protocol: Oblivious Transfer for players in conflict(a 0 , a 1 , b) Let M be the set of players not in conflict with Alice or Bob. 3. Alice calculates a 0 ⊕ p∈M a 0,p and a 1 ⊕ p∈M a 1,p and broadcasts these two bits.
We now prove the security, partial correctness, and fairness of the above protocol.
Security: The secret bit b of Bob cannot be learnt by anyone due to the security of the COT protocol. Now we look at Alices secrets. Let B denote the set of players the receiver Bob is in conflict with and A be the set the sender Alice is in conflict with. The players of the set M can together reconstruct a secret of the sender Alice. But the set M cannot contain all cheaters, the complete collusion is larger. If Alice is honest (otherwise we don't need to protect her secret), then all players of A are cheaters and have to be considered as part of the collusion. The complete collusion able to reconstruct a secret bit and containing all cheaters is then at least as large as A∪M = B c . The set B is contained in A, otherwise Bob would have left the protocol, then B c ∈ A and no collusion of A learns a secret. It remains to be shown that no honest but curiuous player gets to know a secret. As |M | > 1, because no two collusions cover all but one player, Alices secret is always distributed among several honest players and no single honest but curious player can reconstruct it. We can conclude that the protocol is A-secure.
Partial correctness: According to Lemma 23 no player of M can have altered the values of the bits without a new conflict arising. At the end of the protocol the set M contains only the players Alice and Bob are not in conflict with. Thus the players of M cannot have altered the bits, hence we even get 2 P -partial correctness for this protocol.
Fairness is not an issue here as only one player, Bob, learns a result.
The sender is committed to bits a 0 , a 1 as each player p ∈ M is committed to the bits a 0,p , a 1,p the sender can ask all players from M to open the bits. If the bits are not opened correctly either the sender or the receiver will object and a new conflict must arise between a player from M and Alice or Bob.
2 Our next result will show that all steps of the GCOT protocol of [5] can be verified by other players except one step involving an oblivious transfer between two players. If a conflict arises in this step we can replace the oblivious transfer by the protocol of Lemma 24.
Lemma 25 Let P be a set of players where each pair of players is connected by an oblivious transfer channel and every player has access to a broadcast channel. Let
A be an adversary structure for which no two collusions cover P \ {P i } for any player P i . Then a GCOT protocol can A-partially robustly and {A ⊆ P |A c ∈ A}-securely be implemented between two players who are in conflict or a cheater can be identified.
Proof: We will restate the GCOT protocol of [5] without a proof of its security. Details can be found in [5] . Then we will carefully investigate the steps and see, that by replacing GBCX with the modified protocol of Lemma 19 and using the oblivious transfer of Lemma 24 each step either works, or a new conflict arises, or a cheater is identified. The steps which did not work can be repeated and eventually the protocol works or a cheater can be identified unambiguously. In the restated protocol we will use the notation of [5] : indices are superscript and OT(a 0 , a 1 )(b) denotes the Oblivious Transfer for players in conflict(a 0 , a 1 , b) protocol of Lemma 24.
GCOT(a 0 , a 1 )(b) As GBCX commitments as well as zero knowledge proofs convincing a non collusion can be performed by all players unless a cheater is identified (Lemma 19) the honest behaviour of Alice and Bob can be checked by a non collusion in all steps, but in step 4.
If now Bob claims that Alice cheated in step 4. then Alice can open the codewords c 0 , c 1 according to Lemma 24 then either Alice or Bob are caught cheating or if the opening was not successful a new conflict must arise (Lemma 24). If this is the case we repeat the steps 1. to 4. with new random choices. After a finite number of repetitions a cheater will be identified as there cannot be arbitrarily many conflicts. As the codewords which might have to be opened are random and not related to Alices secret inputs no security is lost by restarting the protocol. Hence the security is the same as stated in Lemma 24. 2
IX. CIRCUIT EVALUATION ON DBCS
In the previous sections we developed enough tools to now state the complete protocol which very closely follows the protocol of [5] , but uses the more robust protocols for GBCX, DBC, and GCOT introduced so far. For the convenience of the reader we restate those results and proofs of [5] needed to picture the complete protocol.
First we restate the definition of the boolean function AND on commitments as we will use it for the multiparty protocols later. In [5] it is shown how to obtain an AND on DBCs from a protocol for GCOT:
Lemma 27 With the notation of Lemma 24 we have: Given an oblivious transfer channel between any two players and a broadcast channel then an A-partially robust and {A ⊆ P |A c ∈ A}-secure multiparty protocols for GPAND and AND can be implemented such that whenever a party complains about the result of the protocol a cheater is identified.
Proof: We restate the protocols from [5] to see that they involve only primitives which can be dealt with according to our results so far.
A PAND can be realized by the following protocol: Alice is committed to a and Bob is committed to b. Then Alice chooses a random bit a ′ and runs COT(a ′ , a ′ ⊕a)(b) with Bob who gets b ′ . We have a
For a GPAND protocol the COT protocol has to be replaced by GCOT.
To evaluate an AND on DBCs we observe that
From this we can conclude that an AND operation on DBCs can be realized by n 2 GPAND one for each pair of players and Xor operations for each player.
2 To be able to make circuit evaluation for all possible boolean functions we also need a NOT on DBCs.
Remark 28 Given a set P of players, a DBC of these player, and an adversary structure A for which no two sets of A cover P , then there exists a protocol which is A-partially robust, 2 P -secure, and successfully inverts the bit the DBC stands for or a cheater is identified.
Proof: To implement such a NOT gate one player is picked who must invert his GBCX (his "share" of the DBC which represents a bit b). The player generates a new GBCX and proves that it is unequal to the GBCX he held before. This GBCX together with the GBCX of the other players form a DBC for the inverted bit.
2 All protocols presented so far are only A-partially correct, but they allow the identification of a cheater if they fail. To obtain A-correct protocols from these we use a very simple idea, we will restart the protocol every time it failed without the players who have been caught cheating. The exclusion of cheating players can change the value of the function to be computed. The best solution to this problem would be to have a default input like "unvalid". But the effect of the exclusion of cheating players does not affect the correctness of the protocol as a cheating player could as well have chosen a nonsensical input. In Remark 36 we will deal with the problem that some players might try to change their inputs after a restart.
With the protocols presented so far and restarting the protocol if it fails we get:
Lemma 29 Using the notation of Lemma 24 we get: Given an oblivious transfer channel between any two players as well as a broadcast channel, then every function can be implemented by a multiparty protocol which is A-robust and A-secure if the following conditions hold:
1. the adversary structure A does not contain two sets covering P \ {P i } for any P i ∈ P and 2. the adversary structure A does not contain a complement of a set of A.
Proof: According to Lemma 27 and Remark 28 we can realize the boolean operation AND and NOT on DBCs such that whenever the protocol fails a cheater is identified. Furthermore we can generate DBCs successfully or a cheater will be identified (Lemma 21). Using these techniques we will implement oblivious circuit evaluation. The protocol will be restarted each time it had to be aborted, but without the players which were identified as cheaters.
We will next have to clarify how a protocol begins and how it is ended. Below we will sketch the structure of the comlete protocol, without mentioning possible restarts, closely following [5] .
Initialization Phase: All players have to agree on the function to be computed as well as on the circuit F to be used, they have to agree on an adversary structure A such that the protocol will be A robust and all players have to agree on the security parameters used and on a code C for the GCOT protocol. Furthermore the players agree on how to, in case of a restart of the protocol, choose the input of a cheater which has been excluded from the protocol.
Then all players create DBCs to commit to their inputs.
Computing Phase: The circuit is evaluated using AND and NOT gates on the input DBCs. If the circuit requires several copies of a DBC then a DBC is copied by copying the GBCX it consists of. A GBCX can be copied by copying all its BCX with the procedure of Theorem 15.
Revelation Phase: The result of a computation is hidden in DBCs. These have to be unveiled in a way to ensure the fairness of the protocol. Following [5] we use the techniques from [3, 8] to fairly unveil the secret information such that no collusion can run off with an advantage of more than a fraction of a bit. Of course an A-secure protocol cannot be more than A-fair. 2
X. HIGHER SECURITY BY A MORE CAREFUL ANALYSIS
The result of Lemma 29 is a little bit too pessimistic. It does not take into account that the GCOT protocol has to work only in one direction between every pair of players. Exploiting this property we will be able to obtain security against one more collusion B which may be a complement of a set of the adversary structure A.
We first take a closer look at the situation when a complement of a set from A contains all cheaters and is able to reconstruct a secret bit: 
The receiver of this oblivious transfer is in conflict
with all players from a set containing B and is not in conflict with any player who is in conflict with the sender.
The sender of this oblivious transfer is honest and the receiver is cheating.
Proof: By inspection of the Lemmata 29, 27, 24 we can see, that the only step where the 2 P -security is lost is the use of Lemma 24. The secret which is distributed when applying Lemma 24 is a secret of the sender in the oblivious transfer by Lemma 24. Hence the 2 P -security is lost only if the sender was honest. To complete the proof we look at the set which can reconstruct the distributed secret.
Let a player (Alice) be in in conflict with a set A containing a player Bob and Bob being in conflict with a superset C of the set B. Of course C contains Alice. If we use Lemma 24 to implement oblivious transfer between Alice and Bob then secret bits of Alice are distributed among the players of P \ (A ∪ C) a subset of P \ (A ∪ B) . If Alice is honest (otherwise we need not protect her secret) then all players of A are cheating and the complete collusion able to reconstruct secret bits of Alice is
c contains all cheaters and can reconstruct a secret of Alice, but it can only be a subset of B c if A and B are disjoint, i. e., if B does not contain any player in conflict with the sender.
2 From the proof of Lemma 29 and Lemma 27 we can see that the GCOT within the AND protocol has to work only in one direction between every pair of players. Using this simple observation together with the above remark we are ready to state the main result of this section.
Lemma 31 Let P be a set of n players with every pair of players being connected by an oblivious transfer channel and every player having access to a broadcast channel. Let A and A be adversary structures, then for all functions A-robust and A-secure multiparty protocols exist if 1. the adversary structure A does not contain two sets covering P \ {P i } for any P i ∈ P and 2. the adversary structure A contains only the complement of one previously chosen set B which is maximal in A.
Proof: Let B be any maximal set of A. In addition to Lemma 29 we have to prove that we can additionally prevent B c from reconstructing any secret data. From Lemma 30 we know that a complement of a maximal set B contains all cheaters and can reconstruct a secret only if the receiver of an oblivious transfer by Lemma 24 was in conflict with a superset of B. As B is maximal either the receiver is detected cheating by being in conflict with a set not in A or the receiver has to be in conflict with exactly all players from B. We keep in mind that oblivious transfer, as well as GCOT, is needed in one direction only between every pair of players. We modify the protocol such that a player who is in conflict with exactly the players of B always sends in an oblivious transfer if it is implemented by Lemma 24. It remains to be shown that it is impossible that the receiver and the sender are in conflict with the players of B. Lemma 24 is only employed if the sender and the receiver are in conflict. Hence the the sets of players the sender and the receiver are in conflict with have to differ as no one can be in conflict with himself. 2 In the above result one can see the trade off between robustness and security. The smaller A can be chosen the larger A will be.
XI. THE SECURITY OF THE PROTOCOL AFTER TERMINATION
The result of Lemma 31 guarantees us A-robustness and {A ⊆ P |A c ∈ A} ∪ {B c }-security for a previously chosen B ∈ A, but the security can be even higher depending on the course of the protocol. A trivial example is that 2 P -security is achieved if no player complained during the protocol, because in this case the protocol specializes to the protocol of [5] .
In this section we want to derive the security the protocol guarantees from the knowledge one has after termination. We will see that the the security will be higher than guaranteed by Lemma 31.
To clearly distinguish the security guaranteed in advance and the security which is actually obtained we will speak of a priory security and a posteriori security.
Remark 32 Whenever no cheater can be identified and two players (Alice and Bob) are in conflict with two disjoint maximal sets A, B of A respectively, then every other conflict present must be a conflict between a player from the set A and a player from the set B.
Proof: Let Alice be in conflict with the set A maximal in A and Bob be in conflict with the set B maximal in A and let A ∩ B = ∅. Alice and Bob must be in conflict, because only one collusion from A is cheating. Hence Alice ∈ B and Bob ∈ A. We now look at any additional conflict. This conflict has to involve a player from A otherwise we could identify a cheater, because A would not be a vertex cover of the conflict graph and Bob must be cheating as he is in conflict with all players of A. For the same reason one of the two players in conflict must be contained in B else Alice would be caught cheating. Hence every additional conflict is a conflict between a player from the set A and a player from the set B.
2 With this remark and further exploiting the fact that oblivious transfer is needed only in one direction between every pair of players we get the main result of this paper: Proof: All properties of A and A were dealt with in Lemma 31. Hence we will have to consider only the a posteriori security in this proof.
To achieve the security stated in point 3. of the theorem we need one more modification of the protocol developed so far. Again we keep in mind that oblivious transfer has to be used in one direction only between every pair of players. We will introduce more rules regulating the direction in which oblivious transfer has to be used whenever Lemma 24 is employed.
1. If a player is in conflict with the set B then this player sends only in an oblivious transfer which is implemented by Lemma 24.
2. If a player is in conflict with a maximal set of A and needs to employ Lemma 24, then this player always sends to players who are not in conflict with a maximal set of A.
3. If two players are in conflict with a maximal set of A then we use a previously fixed order < on the set of maximal sets of A. The player in conflict with the maximal set larger with respect to the order < sends and the player in conflict with the maximal set smaller with respect to the order < receives. To be consistent with the above the set B must be maximal with respect to the ordering <.
These additional rules for the direction of oblivious transfers are in accordance with the proof of Lemma 31. Hence we don't need to prove points 1. and 2. from the above theorem as the proof of Lemma 31 still applies. Now we prove point 3. of the above theorem. A set A c with A maximal in A is able to reconstruct a secret only if the receiver of an oblivious transfer was in conflict with the players of A and A does not contain any players the sender is in conflict with (Remark 30). Let the sender be in conflict with the players of a set A ′ then A ′ must be maximal in A or the direction of the oblivious transfer would have to be different (point 2. of the above enumeration). Furthermore A and A ′ must be disjoint as otherwise A would contain a player the sender is in conflict with. We can conclude that a set A c with A maximal in A is able to reconstruct a secret only if there exist two players each of which is in conflict with a maximal set and these two sets are disjoint. From now on we will consider only this situatiuon. From Lemma 32 we know that in such a situation every conflict is a conflict of a player from A and a player of A ′ . So whenever in this case two players are in conflict with maximal sets of A one set must be A and the other must be A ′ . During an oblivious transfer which is implemented by Lemma 24 only A c or A ′c could learn a secret bit, but according to point 3. of the above enumeration the direction of the oblivious transfer is always chosen in a way that only among the players of one of these two sets secrets will be shared. So from the complements of the sets which are maximal in A only one set is excluded from A all other sets of A were already contained in A.
2 Note that we cannot choose the adversary structure A as we cannot choose who will be in conflict with whom.
But it is obvious that the adversary structure A can be read off the set of all conflicts which did occur during the oblivious transfer steps of the protocol. So A is known after the protocol terminated.
Even after termination of a multiparty protocol there is a difference between partial robustness and robustness. After termination of a protocol no collusion can change the result or abort the protocol anymore hence partial robustness is equivalent to security then. But robustness additionally requires that no single honest but curious player learns a relevant secret if a collusion of players leaks their secret data.
We will see in the following that there is a very easy relation between security and robustness after termination of a protocol. This allows us to describe the robustness our protocols achieve during their execution and after termination by Theorem 33 and the following lemma.
Lemma 34 A multi party protocol which is A-secure after termination is B-robust after termination for B = {B|∃A ∈ A : B ⊂ A and B = A}.
Proof: After termination of the protocol no collusion can change the result or abort the protocol anymore hence the only problem left is that a collusion of players leaks their secrets. If a collusion leaks their secret data it can happen that an honest but curious player learns a secret without himself colluding. But it is obvious that for an A-secure protocol the collusion which is leaking secrets plus the honest but curious player must not be contained in A if the honest but curious player is to learn a secret. Hence after termination the protocol is B-robust for B = {B|∃A ∈ A : B ⊂ A and B = A}.
2 Like the protocols of [5] our protocols are efficient as none of our additional protocol steps needs non polynomial resources.
Corollary 35
The protocols of Theorem 33 are efficient in the number n of players and the size of the circuit used to evaluate the function to be computed.
One problem is left. If the inputs of the multiparty computation are time critical we have to keep the players from changing their inputs if the protocol has to be restarted.
Remark 36
To avoid that players change their inputs in a restarted protocol one can let every player commit to his inputs by GBCX before the protocol starts. When restarting the protocol the players have to prove the equality of their newly generated DBC and their original inputs.
As the inputs could even depend on the conflicts appearing we don't allow any complaints in the commit phase before the protocol until all players claim to have committed to all other players.
Following this remark it is clear that every player which will not be caught cheating had to commit his input to a non collusion. This is enough to ensure that every player who will not be expelled from the protocol cannot change the input he committed to following the above remark.
XII. AN APPLICATION TO QUANTUM MULTIPARTY PROTOCOLS
The main problem with quantum protocols like bit commitment is that measurements can be delayed thereby allowing one party to cheat [14, 12] . In [15] secret sharing is used to force honest measurements, following ideas from [4, 16] . Once these measurements are performed the assumptions about possible collusions can be loosened. This kind of temporary assumptions are a very interesting feature of quantum cryptographic protocols. In [15] the following result is proven:
Corollary 37 Let P be a set of players for which each pair of players is connected by a quantum channel and an authenticated insecure channel and every player has access to a broadcast channel. Let A be an adversary structure for which no two collusions cover the set P \ {P i } for any player P i and let M be any maximal set in A. Then for every pair of players, who will not be in conflict after the protocol, an oblivious transfer is possible from one of the two players to the other player which is A-robust and {A c |A ∈ A} ∪ M c -secure.
The problem that oblivious transfer is only implementable between players not in conflict with each other can be solved by the protocols of this paper as normal oblivious transfer cannot be used sometimes as well if players are in conflict. With the results of this paper we are able to give a full proof of the main result of [15] .
Theorem 38 Let P be a set of players each having access to a broadcast channel and every pair of players of P being connected by a quantum channel and an insecure but authenticated classical channel. Then A-robust quantum multiparty protocols for all functions exist if and only if no two collusions of A cover P \ {P i } for any player P i .
These protocols are A-secure after termination if and only if the adversary structure A contains at most one complement of a previously chosen set from A.
XIII. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
We presented multiparty protocols with oblivious transfer which can tolerate disruptors if no two possible collusions of active cheaters together contain all but one players. This is optimal.
If the set of all possible collusions of active cheaters is denoted by A then our protocols are A-secure for an A which does not contain only one complement of a set of A. After termination the protocol is A-secure for an adversary structure A which does not contain any complement of a set of A except the sets of {S ∈ A|S is maximal and S = A}.
Our result has implications on quantum cryptography maybe opening new kinds of applications to quantum channels.
We conjecture that the security of the presented protocols cannot be substantially improved. But the problems dealt with in this paper indicate that there might be a more powerful cryptographic primitive than oblivious transfer (we recently learnt about independent research in this direction [6] ). Every cheater has to take care not to get into conflict with too many players, because the cheater could then be identified. A more powerful primitive could make it difficult to know whom one is cheating. A candidate could be an anonymous oblivious transfer where the receiver is picked at random. Whenever a player tries to send trash over an anonymous oblivious transfer channel this player risks to be in conflict with the receiver which is picked at random.
Another interesting question is whether such an anonymous oblivious transfer channel could be implementedrelative to reasonable assumptions-by a quantum channel. This would imply that there exist situations in which a quantum channel is cryptographically more powerful than oblivious transfer.
